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National efforts to promote college enrollment are increasingly delivered through tax-based 
assistance, including tax credits and deductions for tuition and fees, tax-advantaged college 
savings plans, and student loan interest deductions.  This paper outlines the main tax-based 
student aid programs and describes their history and growth over time. We then provide an 
economic perspective on tax-based student aid, and an assessment of their impact on student 
behavior. We conclude with a discussion of what the tax system does particularly well and what it 
does particularly poorly in comparison to traditional Department of Education-based student aid 
programs, and highlight opportunities for productive reform. At a minimum, a simpler system of 
education tax benefits would decrease the administrative and time costs of transferring funds to 
households with postsecondary expenses. At best, simplification would clarify incentives and 
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<1> 1. Introduction 
There are many ways a society can finance college, and over time the US has tried almost 
all of them. Starting in the 19th Century, state taxpayers funded college education by establishing 
public universities, which are now attended by 80 percent of undergraduates. Through the 
Morrill Act, the federal government provided each state with a large parcel of land, which states 
then sold to raise money for building their colleges. State tax revenues paid for the bulk of  
operating expenses of these colleges, allowing them to charge artificially low prices.  
In the 1960s, portable grants and loans emerged as a new source of government funding 
for college (Table 2 provides a brief description of key federal programs for postsecondary 
education.). With the Higher Education Act of 1965, the federal government established new 
loans and grants for college students.  Unlike the state subsidies, which are delivered to 
institutions, these funds travel with the students, as vouchers, and can be used at any accredited 
college – including private colleges. The Pell Grant, introduced in the early 1970s further 
expanded federal grants for students; still the largest source of grants for college, the Pell targets 
funds on low-income students.  
In recent decades, federal grants and loans have grown even more important, as states 
have scaled back on their subsidies to public colleges, which have, in turn, raised tuition prices.1 
Political pressure mounted on politicians to relieve the burden of rising costs, especially among 
middle- and upper-income families who were not eligible for the Pell Grant.  
In this context, presidential candidate Bill Clinton proposed major new tax benefits for 
college attendance during his 1996 campaign. Since then, the role of the federal tax code in 
subsidizing college has expanded rapidly. In 2015, households received $19.7 billion in tax 
credits for education (Joint Committee on Taxation [JCT] 2015a). The growth has been sharp 
                                            
1 Private colleges have also rapidly increased tuition prices, for reasons debated by economists. 
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and rapid: in 1998, the figure was $4.9 billion (Bulman and Hoxby 2015a).2 And the tax credits 
are just one of more than a dozen different tax subsidies for education. Table 1 shows that these 
tax subsidies together now provide nearly as much support for postsecondary education as does 
the Pell Grant program. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
In this paper, we describe the federal tax subsidies for higher education, their history, 
their incidence, and their behavioral effects. The federal tax system also includes benefits for 
other levels of education, but more than three-quarters of all federal tax expenditures for 
education are for college. The tax system subsidizes the families of future college students 
through the Coverdell and 529 programs, tax-advantaged savings plans authorized by the federal 
and state governments, respectively.  The federal and state tax systems subsidize current college 
students and their families through tax credits, a deduction for tuition costs and loan interest, an 
exclusion of scholarships, grants and tuition reductions from taxable income, and a dependent 
exemption for students aged 19 to 23. Finally, the tax code subsidizes former college students 
with a deduction for interest paid on student loans.  
The tax subsidies for education are now extensive, complicated, and expensive. 
Compelling evidence, using rigorous empirical methods, indicates that the tax credits and tuition 
tax deduction (which account for the bulk of the tax expenditures for education) have precisely 
zero effect on human capital accumulation. If their intent is to increase schooling, they are a 
failure.  
An alternative goal of the tax benefits for education is a transfer to middle-income 
families. If so, they are a very leaky bucket, since they impose extensive administrative burdens 
                                            
2 Dollars adjusted to 2015 real values unless otherwise noted. 
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on households, colleges and government. Reducing the tax rates applied to these families would 
be a more transparent and less expensive approach to achieving this goal.  
Streamlining the tax benefits for education could potentially enhance their efficiency. At 
a minimum, a simpler system of education tax benefits would decrease the administrative and 
time costs of transferring funds to households with postsecondary expenses. At best, 
simplification would clarify incentives and increase investments in human capital. 
 
<1>  2. Overview of Tax Benefits for Higher Education 
<2> 2.1 Rationale and History 
The economic efficiency argument for subsidizing education rests upon the belief that 
students, facing market prices for college, will purchase less than the socially optimal level of 
college. These suboptimal decisions can result from several factors (see Page & Scott-Clayton 
[forthcoming] for a review). First is the presence of social externalities: a college-educated 
population may generate benefits to society above and beyond the benefits reaped by individuals, 
including improved infant health, reduced reliance on social welfare programs, and increased 
civic participation (Oreopoulos & Petronijevic, 2013; Dee, 2004).3  Second, education may also 
involve internalities, or private costs/benefits that are not fully realized at the time of the 
decision. For example, individuals may make suboptimal investments because they 
underestimate their own return to attending or overestimate the cost. Third, common foibles of 
human behavior may result in procrastination, decision avoidance, and default bias in college 
planning and decision-making (Lavecchia, Liu, & Oreopoulos 2014). Finally, if prospective 
                                            
3 Price subsidies may also be justified if families underestimate the value of college, or are unable to make optimal 
investments due to borrowing constraints. Note that these latter two concerns, however, are more commonly cited as 
justifications for need-based financial aid than as justifications for the tax benefits, which are not particularly 
targeted by income. 
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students face credit constraints, they may not be able to borrow enough to make optimal 
investments in college. Along with direct institutional subsidies and financial aid, tax benefits are 
a policy tool that can lower the effective price of college, and thus encourage families to invest 
more in college than they would have otherwise.  
Of course, in practice, tax expenditures may serve other motivations beyond economic 
efficiency, including a desire to redistribute income. Beyond promoting college attendance, 
policy discussions around the higher education tax benefits have also reflected a desire to 
provide assistance to middle-class families (Crandall-Hollick, 2014; Lederman, 1997). While 
targeted tax expenditures may be an economically inefficient means of transferring income to the 
middle class (as opposed to altering the underlying tax brackets and tax rates directly), they have 
proved more popular and easier to implement than fundamental tax reforms. Thus, even if these 
tax benefits do little to promote college enrollment, they may nonetheless serve a transfer 
purpose.  
Policymakers have a variety of tools at their disposal for subsidizing education: they can 
directly subsidize educational institutions through expenditures, they can directly subsidize 
students through student aid or voucher programs, and/or they can implement targeted tax credits 
and deductions. At the state and local level, subsidies for both K-12 and postsecondary education 
have predominantly taken the form of direct expenditures to public institutions, while at the 
federal level, subsidies have predominantly taken the form of direct aid to students.  
The proper role of tax breaks for private spending on education has been a contentious 
topic for decades (Moynihan 1978). Private school associations and parents of children in private 
schools have long lobbied for tax deductions for private school tuition (see Samwick [2013] for 
an analysis of one such proposal). Opponents have viewed such a deduction as a back door to 
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government funding to religious schools. While a number of states eventually implemented tax 
credits for tuition paid at private elementary and secondary schools, federal tuition deductions 
and credits for private elementary and secondary schooling were repeatedly proposed and 
repeatedly defeated over the years.  
Nonetheless, these early efforts to push for tax benefits for private schooling may have 
sown the seeds for the recent expansion of these subsidies in federal postsecondary policy. At 
least two major expansions of the federal role in postsecondary finance were conceived as 
political responses to pressure to institute a private school tax break for middle-income 
constituents: both the Guaranteed Student Loan (introduced in 1965, as part of the Higher 
Education Act) and the Middle Income Student Assistance Act (1978), which extended federal 
financial aid to middle and upper-income families, emerged as compromise policies during 
battles over a tuition tax credit (Hearn 2001).  
From the mid-1960s through the mid-1990s, federal subsidies for higher education 
continued to predominantly take the form of student grants and loans. That began to change with 
the introduction of the Hope and Lifetime Learning tax credits for postsecondary education in 
1997. Since then, the magnitude and scope of federal tax benefits has expanded dramatically, 
driven largely by tax credits. As shown in Table 3, the federal government annually spends over 
$30 billion dollars on an array of tax benefits for higher education, about two-thirds the amount 
provided in federal grants to undergraduates, and more than half the magnitude of all types of 
federal expenditures on elementary and secondary education.4 For context, Table 3 also provides 
                                            
4 The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates $32 billion in tax benefits for postsecondary education in 2015 
(see Table 1). The College Board (2015) estimates $45 billion in federal grants for postsecondary education in 2013-
14. Note that the JCT estimate includes both undergraduate and graduate benefits. U.S. Department of Education 
estimates total federal expenditures of $57 billion on elementary and secondary education in 2012-13 (NCES Digest 
of Education Statistics, Table 235.10. "Revenues for public elementary and secondary schools, by source of funds: 




information on federal tax benefits for other levels of education (the largest of these, the 
deduction for charitable contributions to educational institutions, may apply to any level of 
education). 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Below, we discuss each of the major existing federal tax benefits for college enrollment 
in more detail, along with a brief summary of related benefits that we place outside the scope of 
this discussion. [Note: the role of tax benefits for education has grown over time at the state level 
as well, particularly in recent years in the form of tax-advantaged college savings programs. We 
will not provide a survey of state programs, however, since they are dwarfed in magnitude by the 
federal subsidies.]  
<2> 2.2 Federal Tax Credits and Deductions for Currently Enrolled Students 
The most longstanding tax benefit for households with college students is the dependent 
deduction. While children are generally considered independent for tax purposes after age 
eighteen, the age limit is extended through twenty-three if the child is enrolled in school. This tax 
break allows families to save up to several thousand dollars a year for each child enrolled in 
college because parents can claim a dependent exemption for the student (thus reducing their 
taxable income), or qualify for the Earned Income Tax Credit (a refundable credit for low-
income families).  These provisions save households up to several thousand dollars a year for 
each child enrolled in college and were estimated to cost $4.5 billion in 2015 (Crandall-Hollick 
2016). 
In 1996 Bill Clinton, then a candidate for the presidency, proposed a tax credit for the first 
two years of college costs. After Clinton’s election, this proposal took shape as the Hope and 
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Lifetime Learning Credits, introduced in 1997. These allowed families of college students to 
offset their educational costs with tax credits of up to $1,500 a year.  
The new credits remained largely unchanged for 10 years, with minor tweaks to their 
maximum values and AGI phase-out ranges. But the number of households receiving the credits 
rose by more than half, from about 4.5 million filers in 1998 to 7.5 million in 2008. The credits 
totaled $7.6 billion in the 2008 tax year. 
Responding to critiques that the existing programs were of limited benefit to low-income 
families, presidential candidate Barack Obama proposed a tax credit that would cover a broader 
range of educational expenses than the Hope Credit, and would be partially refundable for 
families with zero tax liability. This proposal took form in 2009 as the American Opportunity 
Tax Credit (AOTC), a renamed and modified version of the Hope credit. AOTC was created as 
part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and temporarily replaced the 
HOPE Credit for 2009 and 2010. AOTC was extended through 2017 by the American Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 2012, and made permanent in late 2015 by the Protecting Americans from Tax 
Hikes (PATH) Act of 2015.  
As of 2015, the maximum benefit for the AOTC is $2,500, with $1,000 refundable. All of 
the first $2,000 in qualifying expenses is eligible for the credit, and 25% of an additional $2,000. 
Eligible expenses include course-related books and supplies. This allows students attending low-
tuition public institutions to access more of the credit. Students are allowed to claim the credit 
for four years of undergraduate education (unlike Hope, which was limited to 2 years). Like the 
former Hope Credit, the AOTC is available for all eligible students in the household; by contrast, 
only one Lifetime Learning Credit may be claimed per household (Department of the Treasury, 
Internal Revenue Service 2011). 
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With the introduction of the AOTC, the cost of the tax credits rose sharply. In 2010, 
spending on the AOTC was nearly $19 billion, comparable to annual spending on the Pell Grant 
program just a few years earlier (Crandall-Hollick 2014b; College Board 2011). Combined 
spending on the AOTC and the much smaller LLC was estimated at approximately $20 billion in 
2015, compared with $30 billion for the Pell program (Crandall-Hollick 2016; College Board 
2015).Since 2002, families not claiming one of the education tax credits have been able to deduct 
up to $4,000 in tuition fees from income (even if they do not itemize).The benefit has been 
repeatedly extended, most recently by the PATH Act of 2015, which extended the deduction 
through 2016.5 Additionally, up to $2,500 in interest on student loans is deductible from taxable 
income, for households with incomes up to $80,000 (single) or $160,000 (married) (Crandall-
Hollick 2014a).  
<2> 2.3 Federal Savings Incentives for Prospective College Students 
In parallel with the tax credits, a set of tax benefits intended to increase education saving 
has emerged. In 1997, the same legislation that established the tax credits created the Education 
IRA, now called the Coverdell Education Savings Account (ESA). The Coverdell is structured 
much like the Roth IRA, with after-tax dollars growing tax-free.  Earnings are never taxed if 
Coverdell withdrawals are used for education expenses. The Coverdell can be used for 
elementary or secondary education, as well as for higher education. The Coverdell currently 
allows for annual, after-tax deposits of up to $2,000. The far more generous contribution limits 
for the 529 vary by state:  cumulative contribution limits for a beneficiary range from $250,000 
to $400,000 (Crandall-Hollick, 2015).  
                                            
5The benefit was originally set to expire in 2005, but in 2006 it was extended to cover 2006 and 2007; in 2008, it 
was extended to cover 2008 and 2009; and in 2010, it was extended to cover 2010 and 2011. For 2011, the income 
limit for this benefit was $80,000 for single filers or $160,000 for joint returns. 
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While the Coverdell is a product of federal legislation, 529 savings plans are an invention 
of the states. The 529 savings plans have their roots in prepaid tuition plans, the first of which 
was introduced by Michigan in 1986. Those who purchased shares in Michigan’s plan were 
guaranteed that their investment would cover the cost of a certain number of semesters at 
Michigan schools. Michigan exempted investment returns in its prepaid plan from state taxes, 
and argued to the Internal Revenue Service that returns should also be exempted from federal 
taxes. The IRS disagreed, but Michigan went forward with the plan and sued the IRS for a refund 
of taxes paid, winning its case in 1994.  
In 1997, Congress codified the federal tax treatment of the tuition plans in Internal 
Revenue Code Section 529. IRC 529 also contains language that recognized a variant on the 
prepaid plans that had been introduced by a handful of states: the tax-advantaged college savings 
plan. Like the Coverdell, these new savings plans allowed after-tax investments to grow free of 
federal and state taxes; however, withdrawals used for postsecondary costs were not exempt 
from federal taxation. With the passage of tax reform in 2001, the federal tax on withdrawals 
from 529 savings plans was eliminated.3 States that did not already have a savings plan quickly 
established one. The growth of the 529 savings plans has far outstripped that of the prepaid 
plans, likely because of their greater fungibility and potentially higher returns. 
While these benefits may appear small from the lens of federal tax expenditures, this lens 
may understate the role of these programs, which are ultimately intended to use the tax benefit to 
leverage much larger private investments in education. Whether or not they actually do so is not 
straightforward to determine, as we will discuss below. What is clear is that the volume of assets 
held in these accounts has grown substantially over time: 529 accounts include over $250 billion 
in assets under management nationally, up from about $10 billion in 2000 and $80 billion in 
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2005  (College Savings Plans Network 2015). In addition, Coverdell accounts held about $7 
billion dollars in mutual funds in 2014 (Investment Company Institute 2016). As these accounts 
are drawn down in the coming decades, their revenue consequences will increase. 
<2> 2.4 Other Tax Benefits for Postsecondary Education 
 Of the higher education tax benefits outlined in Table 1, it is clear that the tax credits are 
by far the largest, representing more than two-thirds of the total. But additional benefits accrue to 
students after graduation, in the form of student loan interest deductions and student loan 
forgiveness. Up to $2,500 in interest on student loans is deductible from taxable income for 
households with incomes up to $80,000 (single) or $160,000 (married). This deduction is for 
interest on any student loans, not just federal loans. This deduction was estimated to cost $1.4 
billion in tax revenue in 2014 (Crandall-Hollick 2014a). With rapid increases in the share of 
middle- income families carrying student loan debt (Simon and Barry 2012), this amount is 
projected to grow to $2.4 billion in 2019 (JCT 2015a).  
 The exclusion of some discharged student loans, in contrast, is estimated to cost only 
about $200 million each year and has remained flat over time. For those aware of the increasing 
generosity of income-based student loan repayment programs, which forgive remaining debt 
after 20 or 25 years depending on the program, this may come as a surprise. The reason for the 
limited tax expenditure on these exclusions is that only loans forgiven for working for a certain 
period of time in “certain professions” or “a broad class of employers” are excluded (IRS 2015). 
Thus, while balances discharged under the Public Service Loan Forgiveness or Teacher Loan 
Forgiveness programs are tax-exempt, those discharged under any of the income-driven 
repayment plans are taxable as income. Moreover, the primary cost of any type of loan 
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forgiveness program is the loan balance itself, not the potential income tax foregone, but only the 
latter is a tax expenditure. 
 The biggest tax benefit for education outside of the higher education tax credits is the 
deduction for charitable contributions to educational institutions, estimated to cost $6.2 billion in 
2015, rising to $7.1 billion in 2019. While it is not possible with the JCT data to separate how 
much of this tax expenditure is due to postsecondary giving, experts estimate that 60-70 percent 
of all charitable giving in education is for higher education (Tyson 2014). The Council for Aid to 
Education, which conducts an annual institutional survey, estimates that postsecondary 
institutions received $40.3 billion in charitable contributions in 2015, the highest level since the 
survey began in 1957 (Council for Aid to Education, 2016).  
 Allowing households to deduct their charitable donations provides an incentive for them 
to give more than they would have otherwise. The policy rationale for such an incentive is that it 
encourages support of institutions that provide broader social value (Randolph, 2015). Critics 
have questioned, however, whether postsecondary charitable giving is always in the public 
interest given the unequal distribution of contributions across institutions. Of the $40 billion 
donated to postsecondary education, 17 elite institutions accounted for more than $10 billion in 
donations received (Lederman, 2016). Many of these same institutions also receive 
disproportionate benefits from the tax-exempt treatment of their endowment gains and land 
holdings (Woodhouse, 2015).  
 
<1> 3. The Incidence and Impact of Tax Benefits for Higher Education 
<2> 3.1 Empirical Challenges 
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Understanding the economic incidence of these tax benefits is critical, whether the goal is 
to change behavior, redistribute resources, or both. Assessing incidence can be tricky, however, 
for at least three reasons. First, any individual tax benefit may interact with other provisions in 
the tax code (or federal financial aid system) in complex ways. Most obviously, who benefits 
most from a tax deduction depends not just on the parameters of the deduction itself, but also on 
marginal tax rates. Claiming one tax credit also may affect eligibility for claiming another.  
Second, take-up is never perfect: not all who qualify for a tax benefit will claim it. In 
some cases the decision not to claim may be a reasoned one; for example, a family may decide 
that the value of current consumption is greater than the value of saving for college. In other 
cases, confusion and bureaucratic hurdles may serve as barriers to take-up.  
Finally, the incidence of a tax benefit may be affected by the responses of other people or 
firms. For example, schools could capture some of the benefits of the tax subsidies by increasing 
tuition or reducing aid.  
A full assessment of incidence thus requires far more than a description of eligibility 
criteria, phase-in and phase-out regions, and benefit calculations. At a minimum it requires 
detailed data on actual tax records for taxpayers of varying characteristics; it may also require 
information on possible institutional responses and an identification strategy for identify causal 
effects. 
For those who do receive a benefit from these subsidies, is it a pure transfer, or do the tax 
benefits increase college enrollment, or increase the quality/intensity of college enrollment? A 
naïve comparison of college enrollments among those that received the tax benefit versus those 
that did not would be contaminated by reverse causality, because those that do not enroll in 
college cannot claim the associated tax benefits.  In other words, college enrollment may 
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determine whether or not a person is “treated” by the tax benefit rather than the other way 
around.  
To estimate the causal impact of the tax benefits requires comparing similar groups, one 
that is potentially eligible for the benefit and one that is not, for reasons that are unrelated to 
potential college enrollment. Since income largely determines eligibility for the tax benefits, and 
income has its own effects on college enrollment, it is difficult to isolate the effect of the tax 
benefits themselves. The most credible estimates of the impact of the education tax credits utilize 
quasi-experimental approaches. Several studies take advantage of changes over time in the 
availability or generosity of benefits for observably similar tax filers, while two studies utilize 
rich administrative data to compare families just above and just below discontinuities or kinks in 
the eligibility formula. These quasi-experimental analyses are described in more detail below.  
Estimating the impact of the education savings incentives and student loan interest 
deductions is yet more challenging, because decades can separate college enrollment and the 
receipt of benefits. For example, families may benefit from education savings incentives for 
nearly two decades before children reach the age of college enrollment. A difference-in-
difference analysis comparing families of, say, 10-year-olds, just before and after the 
introduction or expansion of savings benefits is unlikely to yield clear findings, since the 
“treated” group of families is eligible for the benefit for eight years prior to college-age while the 
“control” group is eligible for only one year less. Attempting to identify a completely unaffected 
group would require examining families at different points in time, during which other factors 
may intervene to contaminate the comparison. These challenges may explain why there is far 
more research on the impact of the tuition tax credits and deductions rather than on the college 
savings and student loan benefits. 
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<2> 3.2. Economic Incidence: Who Benefits? 
<3> 3.2.1 Incidence of the Tax Credits  
From their inception, the LLC and former HOPE credit have primarily benefited middle- 
and upper-income families. At very low AGIs (below $10,000), families did not qualify for the 
credits because they had insufficient tax liability (and the credits were not refundable). Even for 
those with higher AGIs, the value of the credits could be limited by the definition of allowable 
expenses, which consisted only of tuition and fees. A typical, low-income student attending a 
community college with average tuition and fees of $3,322 in 2012-13 (National Center for 
Education Statistics, 2013) and receiving the average Pell Grant of $3,678 (College Board, 2014) 
would have had no expenses eligible for Hope or LLC. For a middle-income student attending a 
more expensive private college and not receiving any grant aid, allowable expenses would 
generate the maximum tax credit. 
The AOTC reaches higher-income families than did the Hope credit. The AGI cap on the 
AOTC is considerably higher than that on the Hope Credit: $180,000 for a joint return. Before 
AOTC, 18% of the dollars devoted to the education tax credits and deductions went to families 
with incomes over $100,000; the figure for 2012 was 24% (College Board, 2014).  The AGI cap 
on the AOTC is higher than that on any of the other credits or deductions. High-income 
households that were once only eligible for the tuition tax deduction are now eligible for the 
more-generous AOTC. As a result, the share of households claiming the deduction has dropped 
while the share claiming the credits has risen. There is no guarantee that households always 
choose the benefit of greatest value, however. Turner (2011a) finds that families often fail to 
optimize, likely due to the complexity of understanding the different eligibility rules and benefit 
calculations and how they interact with other elements in the tax calculation. 
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The AOTC also benefits low-income families more than the old HOPE credit, for two 
reasons. First, because the AOTC is partially refundable, families can benefit from the credit 
even if their income is too low to owe any income taxes. Second, unlike the original HOPE 
credit, the AOTC covers not just tuition and fees but also course-related books, supplies, and 
equipment. This allows low-income students to benefit even if their tuition and fees are already 
fully covered by financial aid. As a result, expenditures for low-AGI families have increased: 
pre-AOTC 5% of the credit and tuition deduction dollars went to filers with incomes under 
$25,000; in 2012 the share was 24%.  
Another factor that affects incidence is how financial aid changes in response to the 
receipt of these tax credits. In the federal financial aid formula, taxes paid are deducted from 
income; thus in general anything that reduces taxes paid will increase ability to pay in the eyes of 
the aid formula. To avoid having the education tax credits unintentionally reduce financial aid 
eligibility, the FAFSA currently requires information on the amount of AOTC and LLC 
received. In practice, however, these and other tweaks to the basic aid formula—which depends 
most heavily on family income, family size, and number in college—have little effect on Pell 
Grant or student loan eligibility (Dynarski, Scott-Clayton & Wiederspan 2013). Institutional aid 
may be more sensitive: Nicholas Turner (2012) finds evidence that some colleges may reduce 
grant assistance nearly dollar-for-dollar for students eligible for tax-based aid. 
<3> 3.2.2 Incidence of Savings Incentives 
The benefits of education savings accounts rise sharply with income, since those with the 
highest marginal tax rates benefit the most from sheltering capital income from taxation. These 
additional deductions have little to no value for low-income families, who often take the standard 
deduction rather than itemize and who face relatively low marginal tax rates. Further, the 
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accounts are risky for families for whom the college attendance of children is uncertain, since 
account holders are penalized if the accounts are not used for schooling (Dynarski 2004). Finally, 
the financial aid system reduces aid disproportionately for those families that hold their assets in 
the 529 or ESA rather than conventional saving vehicles. Since the highest-income families are 
unaffected by the aid tax, this further intensifies the positive correlation between income and the 
advantages of the tax-advantaged college savings accounts. 
3.3 Behavioral Impacts of the Tuition Tax Credits and Deduction  
Long (2004) is the first to provide a quasi-experimental analysis of the impact of 
education tax credits on college enrollment. Using annual data from the October Current 
Population Survey (CPS) from 1990-2000, she identifies families potentially eligible for a 
education tax credit based on income and tax filing status (single or joint return). She uses a 
difference-in-difference approach to compare college enrollment rates for potentially eligible 
versus ineligible households, before and after the introduction of the Hope and Lifetime Learning 
Credits in 1998.  
Long finds no evidence that college enrollments increased faster among eligible groups, 
and hypothesizes that this could be due to lack of awareness among families on the margin of 
college enrollment. She notes, however, that the CPS data are not ideally suited to the analysis: 
income is measured in ranges, making it difficult to precisely determine eligibility and 
potentially attenuating the effect estimates; moreover, for young adults, the availability of family 
income depends upon whether they are still part of their parents’ household, which is itself 
potentially determined by college enrollment status.  
Two later studies using smaller samples with more accurate information on family 
income and later years of data found some positive enrollment effects of the introduction of the 
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tax credits. LaLumia (2010) uses an individual fixed-effects approach, comparing eligible 
individuals’ enrollment status before and after the introduction of the tax credits and tuition 
deduction in 1998, with data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY-79). 
The advantage of this analysis is more detailed data on family income and a window of data 
extending to 2006, giving the tax benefits more time to have an effect. The disadvantage is that, 
due to the age of the sample, effects can only be estimated for older individuals (33 to 50), a 
group for whom college enrollment is relatively rare. LaLumia finds no effect of the benefits on 
enrollment for the sample overall, though positive effects are found for adults whose educational 
attainment in 1998 fell below their expectations in 1979.  
Turner (2011b) applies a difference-in-difference using data from the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP) from 1996-2003. But unlike the prior papers, Turner (2011b) 
focuses not on comparing eligible versus ineligible groups around the introduction of the tax 
credits, but in changes in the generosity of tax-based aid (including the tuition deduction) for 
eligible groups over time. In particular, changes to the tuition deduction in 2002 and increases in 
the generosity of the LLC in 2003 created differential increases in potential aid among eligible 
groups. Turner (2011) focuses on 18-19 year olds and finds that an extra $100 of tax-based aid 
increases college enrollment by 0.4 percentage points – an estimate in line with the magnitudes 
of enrollment effects found for grant aid (see Dynarski and Scott-Clayton, 2013 for a review of 
the impacts of financial aid).  
The positive findings in Turner (2011b) are surprising in light of other work by the same 
author (Turner 2011a, Turner 2012) finding that families often fail to optimize their choice of tax 
benefit and that colleges reduce grant assistance nearly dollar-for-dollar for students eligible for 
tax-based aid. Turner (2011b) notes that these seemingly contradictory findings may be due to 
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differences in the sample examined (Turner 2012 focuses on four-year institutions, which have 
the most grant aid to crowd out, while the enrollment effects in Turner 2011b may be driven by 
two-year enrollees, although the SIPP do not allow him to differentiate). An alternative concern, 
however, is that institutional aid may be increasing differentially for the same income groups 
affected by the increasing generosity of tax benefits over this time period, generating possibly 
spurious estimates of the impact of tax-based aid. 
Two recent papers by Bulman and Hoxby (2015) and Hoxby and Bulman (forthcoming) 
provide the most definitive evidence on the enrollment effects of tax-based aid. Both papers 
utilize rich, individual-level administrative data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on the 
population of potential tax return filers. These data include income and tax data from income tax 
forms as well as W-2 data from non-filers; enrollment information is derived from Form 1098t 
data, which institutions use to directly report to the IRS information on individuals’ enrollment 
intensity and tuition and fee payments. The precise data on income and extremely large number 
of observations enables them to utilize regression discontinuity and regression kink analyses 
around eligibility cutoffs and phase-out regions, in addition to using a difference-in-difference to 
examine the effect of the introduction of the AOTC in 2009.  
Bulman and Hoxby (2015) use a regression kink design to examine the effect of the HTC 
and LLC for filers at the boundaries of the phase-out regions of each credit. The intuition behind 
the design is that in the absence of the “kink” in tax credit eligibility, we should expect the 
relationship between income and college enrollment to change smoothly. In many applications, 
however, data limitations make it quite challenging to distinguish a true “kink” from an abrupt 
but nonetheless smooth change in the outcome distribution. Given the vast data at their disposal, 
this is not a concern in their analysis. They show clear kinks in actual usage of the tax credits in 
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the expected directions over these phase-out regions, but no corresponding kink in enrollment 
behavior.  
In a second analysis, Bulman and Hoxby examine the introduction of the AOTC in 2009, 
using a difference-in-difference approach that makes use of the fact that the AOTC increased 
tax-based aid differentially for filers at various points in the income distribution. They find very 
precisely estimated zero effects on enrollment.  
Finally, Hoxby and Bulman (forthcoming) use a regression-discontinuity design to 
estimate the effects of the tuition tax deduction for families around the maximum income cutoff 
for eligibility. They find evidence that families manage income to fall just below the cutoff, but 
using an “optimal doughnut-hole” design that determines which observations are in the 
manipulable range around the cutoff and then discards these, they find no evidence that the 
deduction impacts college enrollment decisions (or other margins such as enrollment intensity, 
enrollment in a four-year college, tuition paid, or student loans taken).6  
<2> 3.4 Behavioral Effects of the Savings Incentives  
Descriptive research has found that family assets and savings are correlated with 
children’s college enrollment and progress (see review by Elliott & Beverly, 2011). But 
estimating the causal impact of the college savings plans on college enrollments is extremely 
challenging for the reasons discussed above. Still, research on other related programs may be at 
least somewhat informative regarding the likely effects of the program at least on more proximal 
outcomes such as college savings behavior.  
                                            
6 It is worth noting that because families may be eligible for both the AOTC and the deduction for tuition and fees, 
but can only take one or the other, the families who are most affected by the cutoff for the tuition and fees deduction 




For example, a recent randomized experiment examines the effect of additional 
incentives for educational savings. Part of a broader national initiative to promote Savings for 
Education, Entrepreneurship, and Downpayment (SEED) accounts, the SEED for Oklahoma 
Kids (SEED OK) program in 2008 automatically opened a 529 account for infants in the 
treatment group with an initial $1,000 deposit. The program additionally encouraged parents to 
open a second “participant-owned” 529 account by offering a $100 account-opening incentive 
and a savings match for low-income families.7 Approximately a year and a half after treatment 
assignment, 16 percent of families in the treatment group had an individually-owned 529 
account, compared with only about 2 percent of families in the control group, though the treated 
families did not save significantly more overall (Nam, Kim, Clancy, Zager, & Sherraden, 2012).8 
Though the children in the study families are very young, and impacts may grow over time, in 
some ways these results highlight how difficult it is to promote these accounts.  
 
<1> 4. Policy Discussion 
<2> 4.1 Increasing Complexity 
With dozens of tax and aid programs available, two-thirds of students are now eligible for 
some sort of discount on their college costs. The increasing scope and diversity of subsidies for 
education implies increased complexity—both for students trying to estimate their college costs 
and for policy makers trying to ensure coherence across programs. The proliferation of 
programs, each well-intentioned, has created a system that makes it difficult for families—
especially “first-generation” families in which neither parent has attended college—to know just 
how affordable college can be. Calculating the net price of college for a given family requires 
                                            
7 The match was 1:1 for families with AGI below $29K and 0.5:1 for families with AGI between $29K and $43K. 
8 Unsurprisingly, nearly 100 percent of the treatment group accepted the automatic account. 
 
 21 
understanding their finances as well as the rules of the Pell Grant, student loans, the tuition tax 
credits, state grant programs, and aid offered by individual colleges. Evidence suggests that 
students are quite poor at estimating net prices.  
A symptom of the general confusion is that some aid goes unclaimed: the Government 
Accountability Office recently calculated that 14 percent of families eligible for an education tax 
benefit failed to claim it. Forty percent of filers who used the tuition tax deduction would have 
been better off claiming one of the tax credits instead. 
The Government Accountability Office has found that many families do not choose the 
tax advantage that would most benefit them. Families can choose among the AOTC, LLC, 
tuition tax deduction, or disbursement from a 529 or Coverdell to cover current expenses. 
Different types of expenditures (tuition, books, living expenses) qualify for some of these but not 
others. GAO found that about 15% percent of filers made a suboptimal choice, suggesting 
substantial confusion among filers and tax preparers (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2012). 
<2> 4.2 Suitability of Tax System for Delivering Subsidies to Schooling Costs  
In 2011, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) released a 
report highly critical of the administration of the AOTC (Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration, 2011). TIGTA inspected the income tax returns that claimed in AOTC in 2009, 
the first year of the credit, and found ambiguities in two million returns qualifying for $3 billion 
in credits. Most of these flagged returns lacked a Form 1098-T by the IRS that support students’ 
attendance at an eligible college. The same colleges that qualify for federal financial aid qualify 
for the tax credits, so this reflects a failure of coordination between the U.S. Department of 
Education (hereafter, ED), which has a constantly-updated list of eligible institutions, and the 
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IRS which failed to obtain it. The report pointedly referred IRS to a publicly-available dataset of 
institutions in the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System.  
The report also noted that institutions inconsistently fill out the 1098-T, the information 
return that is used to report eligible postsecondary expenses to IRS. The intent of this form is to 
gather information about a student’s costs net of any scholarship aid. The TIGTA concluded that 
some colleges fail to net out scholarships. TIGTA also identified 350,000 cases in which a 
household received a credit even though the information on the 1098-T indicated they did not 
fulfill at least one of the eligibility criteria (at least half-time, undergraduate). The report 
emphasized that reducing fraud and error in the education credits will require better gathering of 
information from taxpayers and postsecondary institutions. 
IRS defended its performance in its response in the TIGTA report, indicating that fraud 
was not nearly as rampant as the report implied (Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration, 2011). In particular, IRS noted that while TIGTA report correctly noted that 
millions of AOTC recipients had not had their postsecondary institutions confirmed, this was due 
not to fraudulent filings but to weaknesses in the IRS’s databases of eligible institutions, which 
they pledged to improve. 
In response to the TIGTA report, legislation was introduced to the House to tighten 
administration of the AOTC. The proposed legislation would require that taxpayers list the 
employer identification number of a student’s postsecondary institution. In theory, this should be 
present on the 1098-T, but apparently some institutions listed incorrectly. 
None of these administrative challenges are insurmountable. The TIGTA is holding IRS 
to a degree of oversight that ED has maintained over colleges for decades. However, while ED 
has all of the necessary lists and procedures and lines of communication in place, IRS is 
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relatively new to the student aid game. Until the agency gets its procedures into place, the 
opportunities for error and fraud are widened. The TIGTA report warns, however, that improving 
these procedures may create additional paperwork burdens for families and colleges. 
With the rapid growth of the tax credits, an increasing number of students now complete 
paperwork for both the IRS and the US Department of Education in order to obtain college 
funding. And there is more paperwork on the horizon for families and colleges, with the 
Treasury Inspector General putting pressure on the IRS to obtain more documentation from 
applicants and colleges regarding their eligibility for the tax credits. If carried through, these 
steps will largely duplicate the work that ED already does in administering the traditional aid 
programs and multiply paperwork burdens on households and colleges. 
ED and IRS bring complementary strengths to the administration of aid for college. ED 
has long experience in delivering aid to students and communicating with colleges.  IRS has a 
well-developed capacity for gathering and verifying income data from households. Conversely, 
IRS has little experience with verifying student enrollment and delivering aid when it is needed. 
And while ED has long experience in gathering income data from applicants, it does so by 
imposing substantial paperwork burdens upon households and colleges. Just one example: 
colleges are statutorily required to “verify” a minimum of 30% of their aid applications each 
year, an auditing process that requires applicants to submit extra supporting documentation, 
including copies of tax returns. Some colleges audit 100% of their aid applications. Were tax 
data alone used to calculate aid eligibility, the data underlying all applications would 
automatically be verified, since it would come from the IRS rather than the applicant. 
<2> 4.3 Prospects for Reform  
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When choosing a path forward, it is critical to keep this in mind: the tax credits and 
tuition tax deduction apparently have no effect on human capital accumulation. Until this year, 
economists strongly suspected that this was the case, but recent evidence based on the universe 
of household tax records (Bulman and Hoxby 2015, Hoxby and Bulman forthcoming) is 
dispositive. The tax credits and tax deduction, which account for most of the tax expenditures for 
postsecondary education, do not affect schooling decisions.  While part of the explanation may 
be that institutions capture some of these tax benefits via reductions in financial aid (Turner 
2012), Hoxby and Bulman (forthcoming) argue that the main explanation relates to how and 
when these benefits are received. In particular, tax benefits may not be realized until nearly a 
year after an enrollment decision is first made, and because the benefits are delivered as part of 
the income tax filing process, the authors argue that they are more likely to be perceived simply 
as a windfall rather than as an incentive for educational investment. 
To achieve the goal of increasing human capital investments, the tax incentives would 
have to be restructured so that they are targeted at households whose investments are plausibly 
sensitive to price, and delivered when schooling expenses are being paid. One proposal 
suggested by Hoxby and Bulman (forthcoming) would be to compute eligibility for the credits 
automatically using income tax information in the year an individual turns 17, rather than the 
year of enrollment, and proactively notify prospective students of their eligibility. In addition, 
they propose that institutions could file to receive the benefits directly from the IRS, so that a 
student would only need to present evidence of eligibility in order to have the institution credit 
their account immediately upon enrollment. 
An even more comprehensive approach would be to consolidate the credits with the Pell 
Grant program, creating a single grant program that subsidizes, at the time that tuition is due, the 
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postsecondary expenses of low- and middle-income families. Eligibility for this program could 
automatically be determined using tax data, with funds delivered by the Department of 
Education. As described in Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2007), families could apply for a 
consolidated grant by simply checking off a box on their income tax forms.  While IRS has all 
the data needed to determine grant eligibility, the Department of Education has the infrastructure 
in place to deliver funds to schools. We therefore suggest that the role of the IRS be limited to 
forwarding applicants’ adjusted gross income, dependency status, and number of dependents to 
the Department of Education, which will calculate aid eligibility and send vouchers directly to 
the institutions at which students are enrolled. This consolidation would eliminate the duplicative 
administrative burdens now placed upon colleges and households by Treasury and ED. Treasury 
has a comparative advantage in calculating ability to pay, given it already serves this function for 
the income tax system. ED has a comparative advantage in delivering funds to schools and 
colleges, given it already serves this function with the Pell and Stafford loan programs. Dynarski 
and Scott-Clayton (2007) show that the existing combined distribution of Pell awards and tax 
credits could be replicated using only information available from income tax records. While a 
natural concern is that lots of wealthy families may suddenly qualify for aid if assets are not 
considered (as they are in the current federal student aid application), Dynarski and Scott-
Clayton (2007) show that vanishingly few families with incomes low enough to qualify for Pell 
Grants have assets that would disqualify them for an award.9 
The goal of the education tax incentives could instead be redefined as explicitly 
redistributive: the transfer of income to households with postsecondary expenses. In this case, 
the transfer should be achieved at the lowest cost possible to households, government and 
                                            
9 This is due both to low levels of assets in general, as well as the fact that most assets are in the form of primary 
housing or retirement accounts, both of which are excluded in the federal financial aid formula. 
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colleges. A relatively straightforward subsidy to postsecondary education is already embedded in 
the dependent deduction, which applies to children up to age 24 if they are enrolled in college. 
This provision also extends eligibility for the EITC. A single, refundable credit could be created 
to make the subsidy more generous. Currently, the AOTC is calculated as 100 percent of the first 
$2,000 in expenses and 25 percent of the next $2,000, but just 40 percent of this total is 
refundable. A simplified credit could be equal to 100 percent of eligible expenses (up to a limit) 
and fully refundable.  
The tax benefits for education are a costly way to reduce the tax burden on middle-
income families, imposing extensive administrative costs on households, colleges and 
government. Reducing the tax rates applied to these families would be a more transparent and 
less expensive approach to achieving this goal. At a minimum, a simpler system of education tax 
benefits would decrease the administrative and time costs of transferring funds to households 
with postsecondary expenses. At best, simplification would clarify incentives and increase 
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Federal Support for Postsecondary Students by Source, 2013 (in Billions) 
 





Supplemental Educational Opportunity $0.7 
Other $0.7 
 
Loans  $95.9 
Unsubsidized Stafford $51.9 







Total Federal Support $182.9 
 
Notes: Grants, loans, and work study information for 2013-14; tax benefits information for 
2013. Loan amounts represent total amounts disbursed (rather than net costs to the 
government). Table adapted from College Board (2014) for grants, loans, and work study, and 








Description of Key Federal Programs for Postsecondary Students 
 
 
Federal Tax Credits and Deductions  
Hope Credit Provided a maximum credit of $1,800 for qualifying expenses relating 
to tuition and fees, only for students in their first two years of college, 
and only for families with tax liability. The American Opportunity Tax 
Credit replaced the Hope credit in 2009. 
Lifetime Learning 
Credit (LLC) 
Eligible tax filers are able to receive a maximum credit of $2,000 for 




AOTC replaced the Hope the credit in 2009 and allows for a credit up 
to $2,500 for expenses relating to tuition and fees and course materials. 
The credit rate is 100 percent for the first $2,000 of expenses and 25 
percent on the next $2,000. Up to $1,000 of the credit is refundable for 
families with limited or no tax liability. 
Tuition & Loan 
Interest Deductions 
These deductions offer filers a maximum deduction of $4,000 for 
expenses relating to tuition and fees. To date, this deduction only 
extends through 2016.   
Saving Incentives Interest accumulates tax-free when families save for college using 
Federal Coverdell accounts and state 529 savings plans. Withdrawals 
from these accounts are not taxed unless the amount withdrawn is 
greater than the student’s education expenses. 
Dependent Exemption A parent or guardian has the ability to claim an exemption for a 
dependent who is between the ages 19 and 23 and is a full-time student. 
The filer is allowed an exemption of $3,950 per dependent. 
  Federal Student Aid Programs  
Pell Grant The largest funded need-based aid program in the United States. 
Currently, students can receive a grant amount up to $5,500. The size 





Subsidized and unsubsidized loans, also known as Stafford Loans, are 
administered by the federal government through the Federal Direct 
Loan Program (FDLP). Unsubsidized loans are available to all students 
regardless of need. With subsidized loans, eligibility is based on need 
and the federal government pays the interest on these loans while the 
student is in college. The maximum amount a dependent student can 
borrow for an undergraduate degree under the Stafford Loan programs 
is currently $31,000. 
 






Estimated Tax Expenditures on Tax Benefits for Education (in Billions of Dollars) 
      
       
Tax Benefit 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019        
Benefits exclusively for higher education: 
     
       
Credits for tuition for post-secondary 
education  19.7 21.0 21.1 14.8 21.3        
Parental personal exemption for students 
aged 19 to 23 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.5        
Exclusion of scholarship and fellowship 
income 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.4        
Deduction for interest on student loans 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4        
Exclusion of employer-provided education 
assistance 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3        
Exclusion of tax on earnings of qualified 
tuition programs: 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.5        
Exclusion of employer-provided tuition 
reduction benefits 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3        
Deduction for tuition and fees 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0        
Exclusion of certain discharged student loans 
from income 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2        
Exclusion of earnings of Coverdell education 
savings accounts 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1        
Subtotal 31.7 33.8 34.5 28.8 36.0        
Other tax benefits for education: 
     
       
Deduction for charitable contributions to 
educ. institutions 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.8 7.1        
Exclusion of interest on State/local govt 
bonds for educational facilities 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.1        
Qualified school construction bonds  1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4        
Exclusion of interest on State/local govt 
bonds for student loans 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5        
Deduction for expenses of elem./secondary 
school teachers n/a 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3        
Credit for holders of qualified zone academy 
bonds  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1        
Grand Total 42.0 44.6 45.8 40.7 48.5        
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation (2015a). To adjust reported amounts for 
recent changes as a result of the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) 
Act of 2015, budget impact estimates from the Joint Committee on Taxation 
(2015b) are also incorporated. See Crandall-Hollick (2016) for addition notes on 
the higher education tax benefits. 
       
 
      
 
